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therefore subject to the ninety-day statute of limitations governing
such approval. In addition, the court concluded that the trial court
erred in exempting SCWD's proposed water treatment facility from
zoning laws.
The court first determined whether Topsail's original petition,
which challenged only the County's 1999 parcel legality
determination, also represented a challenge to the County's 1992
parcel map approval. Topsail challenged the legality of the parcels
pursuant to a determination made by the County's Planning
Department in 1999 that the parcels were legal, despite the original
subdivider's failure to comply with conditions to the 1992 Minor Land
Division approval. The court concluded that any challenge to the
legality of the parcels represented a challenge to the erroneous 1992
approval, since that approval originally established the legality of the
parcels. The court then determined that a ninety-day statute of
limitations governed the 1992 approval pursuant to the relevant
government code. Thus, the trial court should have barred Topsail's
challenge.
The court then addressed whether SCWD's proposed water
treatment plant was subject to zoning laws. Specifically, the governing
statute exempts facilities that produce or generate water from zoning
laws. Finding minimal help in the plain meaning of the statute and
the legislative history behind the statute, the court resorted to the
general rules of construction that mandate courts to strictly construe
exceptions in statutes. The court determined that a strict construction
of the statute leads to the conclusion that the proposed water
treatment facility is subject to zoning laws; therefore, the trial court
erred in exempting SCWD's proposed facility from the zoning
ordinances.
The court directed the trial court to vacate its original order, and
to enter a new order denying Topsail's challenge to the legality of the
parcels and granting Topsail's petition to compel SCWD compliance
with zoning laws regarding its planned water treatment facility.
Kate Osborn
Vadnais v. Cambria Cmty. Servs. Dist., No. B 153607, 2003 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 1549 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2003) (denying property
owners' takings claim because receiving a water connection is not a
protected property interest).
Dean and Gloria Vadnais and Fred Keeler ("Vadnais") filed a
petition for a writ of mandate and complaint for damages against the
County of San Luis Obispo ("County") and the Cambria Community
Services District ("District") for denying their permit for a
condominium project. Vadnais also filed a cease and desist motion for
an alleged violation of the County's Local Coastal Program ("LCP").
The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County sustained the
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demurrers to the petition and complaint without leave to amend and
denied the cease and desist motion. The Court of Appeal of
California, Second Appellate District, Division Six affirmed the
judgment of dism;ssal.
Vadnais owned an eleven-acre parcel of property in an
unincorporated area in the County and planned to develop part of the
land into twenty-five condominium units. Vadnais submitted a
condominium development plan that the Coastal Commission
Those opposing the project
("Commission") initially approved.
appealed to the Commission and the Commission then overturned its
decision because Vadnais was unable to obtain an intent-to-serve letter
from the District which provides sewer and water service. Though the
County placed Vadnais on its waiting list, the District refused to issue
intent-to-serve letters to projects on the County's list until the District
exhausted its own list.
The County's LCP limited the number of residential building
permits for the area and required the District to reserve thirty percent
of its water allocations for multi-family units. However, the County
only issued twenty percent of its building permits to multi-family
housing projects. Vadnais maintained that the County must issue the
full thirty percent to multi-family housing projects.
Vadnais first argued the trial court erred when it sustained the
County's demurrer to the causes of action for mandate and declaratory
relief because the County had a mandatory duty to comply with the
thirty percent figure of the LCP. The court found that the Coastal Act
did not require the County to issue any development permits and did
not create a mandatory duty on the County to provide permits. By
arguing the issue in the abstract, Vadnais did not show how the County
failed to comply with LCP. The Commission rejected the project
because of the lack of an intent-to-serve letter required under the LCP.
Therefore, the court found that the LCP demanded permit denial and
the County did not violate the LCP.
Vadnais next argued the trial court erred in sustaining the
District's demurrer without leave to amend. The court found the LCP
was not binding on the District and did not require the District to issue
an intent-to-serve letter and Vadnais failed to show that the District did
not comply with the LCP.
Finally, Vadnais contended that the County and District's actions
resulted in a taking of property without just compensation. The court
also found this contention to fail because the entire parcel owned by
Vadnais was not fully restricted. Vadnais could still receive an intentto-serve letter once the District fulfilled its waiting list. Vadnais did not
have a protected property interest in receiving a water connection,
thus, the court found no taking of the property.
Julie S. Hanson

